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Abstract
Checking compatibility of services accessed through their behavioural interfaces is a crucial issue in Service
Oriented Computing which aims at building new systems from existing software services. In this paper, we
consider a model of services which takes value passing and non-observable actions into account. We propose
an approach to check in a uniﬁed way several compatibility notions between two service protocols using the
rewriting logic system Maude. In particular, we illustrate our approach with three widely used compatibility
notions, namely opposite behaviours, unspeciﬁed receptions and deadlock freeness. These notions as well
as several strategies to handle non-observable actions have been formalised and fully implemented into a
prototype tool which is able to automatically detect whether two services are compatible, and return a
counterexample if they are not.
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1 Introduction
The main principle of Component Based Software Engineering (CBSE) and Service-
Oriented Computing (SOC) is the reuse of existing software components or Web
services 4 when building new systems in order to save time and eﬀorts. In this
context, interoperability issues must be avoided and reused services have to ﬁt with
other services in the system being developed. Therefore, compatibility checking is a
crucial concern to ensure whether services can interoperate successfully. However,
verifying compatibility is especially diﬃcult when the model of services takes inter-
action protocols into account which is essential [20] to avoid erroneous behaviours
or deadlock situations when executing together a set of services.
1 Email: duran@lcc.uma.es
2 Email: meriem@lcc.uma.es
3 Email:salaun@lcc.uma.es
4 In the remainder of this paper, we will refer to both software component and Web service using the
generic term service.
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Numerous compatibility notions have already been proposed based upon several
description models of service interfaces, see for instance [23,9,20,2] for automata,
[4,10] for π-calculus, [14,16,17] for Petri nets and [1,5] for state machines. Most
of these approaches focus on a unique compatibility notion deﬁned with respect
to a speciﬁc application area, see for instance [17] for service composition, [1,5,14]
for service substitution, [10] for service choreography, etc. Compared to existing
works, new contributions of our proposal are the following: (i) our model takes into
account value-passing as well as non-observable or internal actions (τ actions), and
considers diﬀerent strategies to handle them; (ii) we propose a framework where
several notions of compatibility can be checked automatically, and this framework
can be extended with new compatibility notions and new strategies to handle in-
ternal actions. Note that internal actions in interface models are very important
because some services can be compatible from an observable point of view, but their
execution will behave erroneously due to uncontrolled internal behaviours.
Our model of service interfaces allows to specify interaction protocols (messages
and their application order). Value-passing and internal actions are also consid-
ered. Our framework provides a uniform and systematic way of checking diﬀerent
notions of compatibility, considering diﬀerent strategies to deal with internal ac-
tions. Here, we focus on three widely used compatibility notions, namely opposite
behaviours [21], unspeciﬁed receptions [3,23], and deadlock freeness [2]. But other
notions are already available in our framework and additional ones could be con-
sidered in the future. Moreover, we consider three diﬀerent τ handling strategies,
namely the strong, weak, and trace strategies introduced by Robin Milner in the
context of equivalence checking in the 80s [21], and similarly, additional ones could
be added to the framework as well. Note that it is important considering diﬀerent
strategies, since each of them makes sense depending on the objective of the com-
patibility check. Thus, for example, a trace strategy is well suited if one wants to
compare external behaviours, whereas a weak strategy allows to detect some subtle
errors when composing services. A strong strategy is required when two services
must exactly match from an internal and external point of view as it is the case
while substituting one service for another.
Our solution for checking protocol compatibility is independent of any speciﬁc
application, and therefore can be useful for several issues, such as automatic service
composition, software adaptation, service substitution, service discovery, code re-
engineering, etc. Our proposal has been implemented in the rewriting logic system
Maude [7]. Its powerful rewriting engine and searching capabilities open a very wide
range of possibilities. Moreover, its expressivity has allowed us to implement the
diﬀerent notions and strategies at a very high level of abstraction, without compro-
mising eﬃciency, and allowing such a ﬂexible and extensible general framework.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formalises our
model of services. Section 3 introduces some preliminaries and the notions of com-
patibility we use in this paper for illustration purposes. In Section 4, we present
how service compatibility is checked using Maude. Section 5 presents a comparison
with related approaches. Finally, Section 6 draws up some conclusions.
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Fig. 1. Operational Semantics of one STS
2 Model of Services
We assume that service interfaces are equipped both with a signature (set of required
and provided operations) and a protocol represented by a Symbolic Transition Sys-
tem (STS). Communication between services is represented using events relative to
the emission and reception of messages corresponding to operation calls. Events
may come with a list of parameters whose types respect the operation signatures.
In our model, a label is either the internal action τ or a tuple (m, d , (p1 , . . . , pn))
where m is the message name, d stands for the communication direction (either an
emission ! or a reception ?), and (p1, . . . , pn ) is either a list of data terms if the label
corresponds to an emission, or a list of variables if the label is a reception.
Deﬁnition 2.1 [STS] A Symbolic Transition System or STS is a tuple
(A,S , I ,F ,T ) where: A is an alphabet which corresponds to the set of labels asso-
ciated to transitions, S is a set of states, I ∈ S is the initial state, F ⊆ S are the
ﬁnal states, and T : S × A× S is the transition function.
In the remainder of this paper, we describe a transition using a tuple (s, l , s ′) such
that s and s ′ denote the source and target states, respectively, and l stands for the
label.
Our STS is a reduced version of STG (Symbolic Transition Graph) introduced
in [15]. Here, guards are abstracted as τ transitions, which denote internal (non-
observable) activity to the service. The operational semantics of one STS (−→b) is
deﬁned with three rules (TAU, EM, REC, Figure 1).
The operational semantics of n (n > 1) STSs (−→c) is formalised using a syn-
chronous communication rule (COM, Figure 2) in which value-passing and variable
substitutions rely on a late binding semantics [19], and an independent evolution
rule (INEτ , Figure 2) . {as1, . . . , asn} is a set of couples 〈si ,Ei 〉, where each couple
〈s,E 〉 is composed by an active state s ∈ S and a data environment E . A data
environment is a set of couples 〈x , v〉 where x is a variable and v a ground value.
We use a function type which returns the type of a variable or a value, and we deﬁne
the environment update “”, and the evaluation function ev as follows:
E  〈x , v〉  E (x ) = v
ev(E , x )  E (x )
ev(E , f (v1, . . . , vn))  f (ev(E , v1), . . . , ev(E , vn))
The STS formal model has been chosen because it is simple, graphical, and it
can be easily derived from existing implementation platforms’ languages (see for
instance [12,22,11] where such abstractions for Web services were used for veriﬁ-
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user
login! usr:string,pwd:string
searchFlight! dis:string,dep:tdate,ret:tdate
ττ
u2u1
u5
u3
u7
u8
u6
u9
searchFlight? Id:int, price:floatτ u4
searchCar! 
d1:date,
d2:date,
type:string
searchCar? Id:int
searchHotel!
dep:tdate,ret:tdate, 
cat:string
searchHotel? id:int
server
login? usr:string,pwd:string
s2s1
s3
s10
s6
s9
searchFlight! Id:int,price:float
s4
searchCar? 
d1:date,
d2:date,
type:string
searchCar! id:int
searchHotel?
dep:tdate, ret:tdate, 
cat:string
searchHotel! id:int
searchFlight? dis:string,dep:tdate, ret:tdate
s7
s8
s5
searchFlight? dis:string,dep:tdate,ret:tdate
searchHotel?
dep:tdate, ret:tdate, 
cat:string
searchHotel! id:int
Fig. 3. User and Server Behavioural Interfaces
cation, composition or adaptation purposes). For space reasons, in the rest of the
paper, we will describe service interfaces only with their STSs. Signatures will be
left implicit, yet they can be inferred from the typing of arguments (made explicit
here) in STS labels.
Example. We use as running example a travel advice system which gives infor-
mation for travelers. As it can be observed in Figure 3, the user interface can ﬁrst
log on to a server by sending its user name and password (login!). Then, it can
request (searchFlight!) and receive (searchFlight?) a ﬂight identiﬁer and price ac-
cording to the wished destination and departure and return dates. Depending on
its preferences (internal choice speciﬁed with τ transitions in the user protocol), the
user can either start a new ﬂight request, ask for a hotel advice (searchHotel!), and
then it receives the answer (searchHotel?), or ask for a car advice (searchCar!), get
the answer (searchCar?), and then start a hotel advice request. The server service
starts by receiving a user name and password (login?). Next, this service can receive
and reply several ﬂight requests until a request for a car and/or a hotel advice is
received and replied.
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3 Service Protocol Compatibility
We start with some deﬁnitions useful for the formalisation of service protocol com-
patibility that we will present in Section 3.4. Since our model considers τ actions,
the deﬁnition of diﬀerent compatibility notions depends on how these non-observable
actions are handled. In this paper, we consider three widely used τ handling strate-
gies, namely strong, weak and trace [21], and the compatibility notions can be
checked with respect to each of these strategies. Moreover, we formalise the diﬀer-
ent notions of protocol compatibility using the concepts of set of global reachable
states and transition compatibility.
3.1 Preliminaries
In this paper, we focus on the case of two services described using STSs STSi =
(Ai ,Si , Ii ,Fi ,Ti ), i ∈ {1, 2}. We deﬁne a function outT (s) which returns the set
of transitions going out from the state s in the transition set T . Last, functions
reachableT (s) and reachableT ,l (s) return the set of states which can be reached from
the given state s, and the set of states which can be reached from the given state s
using transitions labeled with l in the transition set T , respectively:
• outT (s) = {(s
′, l , s ′′) | (s ′, l , s ′′) ∈ T , s = s ′}
• reachableT (s) = {s1, .., sm} ∪ reachableT (s1) ∪ . . . ∪ reachableT (sm )
where {s1, .., sm} = {s
′′ | (s ′, l , s ′′) ∈ T , s = s ′}
• reachableT ,l (s) = {s1, .., sm} ∪ reachableT ,l (s1) ∪ . . . ∪ reachableT ,l (sm )
where {s1, .., sm} = {s
′′ | (s ′, l ′, s ′′) ∈ T , s = s ′, l = l ′}
Comparison of labels is useful to check whether exchanged messages are com-
patible or not. Formally, we deﬁne label compatibility as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Label compatibility] A label l1 is compatible with a label l2 if:
• l1 = (m1, d1, (p11, . . . , p1n )), l2 = (m2, d2, (p21, . . . , p2m )) such that m1 = m2,
d1 = d2, n = m, and ∀ k = 1, ..,n type(p1k ) = type(p2k ) or,
• l1 = τ and l2 = τ .
where ! =?, ? =!.
3.2 Successor States
Given two STSs STSi = (Ai ,Si , Ii ,Fi ,Ti ), i ∈ {1, 2}, we deﬁne a global state as a
pair of states (s1, s2) where si is a current state of STSi . Then, the protocol compat-
ibility will be checked for all global reachable states. Therefore, we use the auxiliary
functions successorsTS ((s1, s2)) and reachableTS ((s1, s2)) which respectively provide
the set of global states that can be reached, in one step, from a current global state
(s1, s2), and the set of all global reachable states for two STSs, where TS stands for
the considered τ handling strategy, namely strong, weak or trace, etc. Note that
both successorsTS ((s1, s2)) and reachableTS ((s1, s2)) sets are obtained by application
of the COM and INEτ rules given in Figure 2.
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In our approach, the successor states function depends on the diﬀerent ways of
dealing with τ actions. In the following, we present the successor states function
for the strong, weak and trace strategies.
We start by deﬁning the strong successor states, in which every label held by a
transition going out from a state of one service must be matched with a label hold
by a transition going out from a state of the other service, even for τ actions.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Strong Successor States] The set of global states which are strongly
reachable, in one step, from a current global state (s1, s2) is deﬁned as follows:
successorsstrong ((s1, s2)) = {(s
′
1, s
′
2) | (s1, l1, s
′
1) ∈ T1, (s2, l2, s
′
2) ∈ T2 such that l1
and l2 are compatible}
We deﬁne now the weak successor states. As far as τ actions are concerned, we
require that each τ action is matched by zero or more τ actions.
Deﬁnition 3.3 [Weak Successor States] The set of global states which are weakly
reachable, in one step, from a current global state state (s1, s2) is deﬁned as follows:
successorsweak ((s1, s2)) = {(s
′
1, s
′
2) | (s1, l1, s
′
1) ∈ T1, (s2, l2, s
′
2) ∈ T2, l1 
= τ such
that l1 and l2 are compatible}
∪ {(s ′1, s2) | s
′
1 ∈ reachableT1 ,τ (s1), and reachableT1 ,τ (s
′
1) =
∅ or ∃(s ′1, l1, s
′′
1 ) ∈ T1 such that l1 
= τ}
∪ {(s1, s
′
2) | s
′
2 ∈ reachableT2 ,τ (s2), and reachableT2 ,τ (s
′
2) =
∅ or ∃(s ′2, l2, s
′′
2 ) ∈ T2 such that l2 
= τ}
A weaker deﬁnition of successor states consists in determining the set of global
states that can be reached from the current one, in one step, by execution of the
same traces. By doing so, τ actions are just not considered in the service protocols.
Deﬁnition 3.4 [Trace Successor States] The set of global states which are trace
reachable, in one step, from a current global state (s1, s2) is deﬁned as follows:
successorstrace ((s1, s2)) = {(s
′
1, s
′
2) | (s1, l1, s
′
1) ∈ T1, (s2, l2, s
′
2) ∈ T2, l1 
= τ and such
that l1 and l2 are compatible}
∪
⋃
(s1,τ,s′′1 )∈T1
successorstrace ((s
′′
1 , s2))
∪
⋃
(s2,τ,s′′2 )∈T2
successorstrace ((s1, s
′′
2 ))
Example. We focus on small parts of our running example to illustrate how the
successor states can be obtained for the strong, weak and trace strategies. Let us
consider the global state (u1, s1):
successorsstrong ((u1, s1)) = successorsweak ((u1, s1))
= successorstrace ((u1, s1))
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= {(u2, s2)}
Since there is no τ action hold by a transition going out from u1 and s1, we obtain
the same set of global states reachable, in one step, from (u1, s1) according to any
τ strategy.
Now, let us consider the global state (u4, s4):
successorsstrong ((u4, s4)) = ∅
successorsweak ((u4, s4)) = {(u2, s4), (u5, s4), (u7, s4)}
successorstrace ((u4, s4)) = {(u3, s3), (u6, s5), (u8, s9)}
As it can be observed in Figure 3, all the transitions going out from u4 hold τ
actions, namely {((u4, τ, u2)), (u4, τ, u5), (u4, τ, u7)}, while all actions hold by the
transitions outgoing from s4 are diﬀerent to τ , namely {(s4, searchFlight ? dis :
string , dep : tdate, ret : tdate, s3), (s4, searchHotel ? dep : tdate, ret : tdate, cat :
string , s9), (s4, searchCar ? d1 : date, d2 : date, type : string , s5)}. By application
of the strong successor states deﬁnition, the τ actions at u4 do not match with
any action at s4, and none of the expected receptions at s4 can be emitted at
u4. Hence, there is no global state that can be strongly reachable from (u4, s4).
Considering the deﬁnition of weak successor states, the τ actions at state u4 are
skipped because all the transitions going out from this state are labeled with τ .
Therefore, the set of global states weakly reachable, in one step, from (u4, s4) is
{(u2, s4), (u5, s4), (u7, s4)} since reachableTuser ,τ (u2) = ∅, reachableTuser ,τ (u5) = ∅
and reachableTuser ,τ (u7) = ∅. Finally, following the trace successor states deﬁnition,
as it is shown in Figure 3, the set of global states {(u3, s3), (u6, s5), (u8, s9)} can be
reached, in one step, from (u4, s4) using traces of compatible labels.
In order to obtain the set of all global reachable states for two STSs starting
from an initial global state (s1, s2), we present the following deﬁnition:
reachableTS ((s1, s2)) = {(s1, s2)} ∪
⋃
(s′1,s
′
2)∈successorsTS ((s1,s2))
reachableTS ((s
′
1, s
′
2))
3.3 Transition Compatibility
As successor states, compatibility of transitions going out from a global state (s1, s2)
depends on how τ actions are handled. Transition compatibility consists in checking
if the sent (respectively, received) messages at a state s1 could be received (respec-
tively, sent) at another state s2 and vice versa. To do so, we took inspiration from
the equivalence notions stated by Milner [21] to present the following deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 3.5 [Strong Transition Compatibility] Given a global state (s1, s2),
comp-em-recstrong ((s1, s2)) = true iﬀ ∀(si , li , s
′
i ) ∈ Ti , with i ∈ {1, 2}, ∃(sj , lj , s
′
j ) ∈
Tj , with j = i mod 2 + 1, such that li and lj are compatible.
Deﬁnition 3.6 [Weak Transition Compatibility] Given a global state (s1, s2),
comp-em-recweak ((s1, s2)) = true iﬀ:
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• ∀(si , li , s
′
i ) ∈ Ti with i ∈ {1, 2}, li 
= τ, ∃(sj , lj , s
′
j ) ∈ Tj , with j = i mod 2 + 1
such that li and lj are compatible, and
• ∀(si , τ, s
′′
i ) ∈ Ti , with i ∈ {1, 2}, comp-em-recweak ((s
′′
i , sj )) = true, and
∀(sj , τ, s
′′
j ) ∈ Tj , with j = i mod 2 + 1, comp-em-recweak ((si , s
′′
j )) = true.
Deﬁnition 3.7 [Trace Transition Compatibility] Given a global state (s1, s2),
comp-em-rectrace ((s1, s2)) = true iﬀ:
• ∀(si , li , s
′
i ) ∈ Ti , with i ∈ {1, 2}, li 
= τ, ∃(sj , lj , s
′
j ) ∈ Tj , with j = i mod 2 + 1
such that li and lj are compatible, and
• ∀(si , τ, s
′′
i ) ∈ Ti , with i ∈ {1, 2}, ∃(s, l , s
′) ∈ Ti , l 
= τ , such that s ∈
reachableTi ,τ (si ) then ∃(s
′
i , s
′
j ) ∈ successorstrace ((s1, s2)) where s
′
i = s
′.
Example. Figure 4 shows a part of our running example. Considering the global
state (u4, s4), com-em-recTS ((u4, s4)) returns false if TS is strong or weak , and
true if TS is trace. Since there are transition labels at u4 (respectively at s4)
which do not match with transition labels at s4 (respectively at u4), com-em-
recstrong ((u4, s4)) = false. By application of the weak transition compatibility notion,
com-em-recweak ((u4, s4)) = true iﬀ:
com-em-recweak ((u2, s4)) = true and com-em-recweak ((u5, s4)) = true and com-em-
recweak ((u7, s4)) = true.
Let us focus on (u2, s4). The transition label (searchCar ? d1 : date, d2 : date, type :
string) at s4 does not match with any transition label at u2, and thus com-em-
recweak ((u2, s4)) = false. Therefore, com-em-recweak ((u4, s4)) = false.
Last, by skipping the transitions holding τ actions at u4, we always have traces of
compatible labels starting from (u4, s4). Hence, com-em-rectrace ((u4, s4)) = true.
3.4 Formalising Some Service Compatibility Notions
Various notions of service compatibility exist [4,17,14,1,5] setting diﬀerent require-
ments on how services are compatible. There is no standard or unique service
compatibility notion, all of them are useful for diﬀerent application domains. For
illustration purposes, we focus here on three widely used notions, namely opposite
behaviours, unspeciﬁed receptions and deadlock freeness.
Opposite behaviours. The strongest and most intuitive compatibility notion is
that of opposite behaviours. In this paper, our deﬁnition of opposite behaviours
compatibility is inspired from the bisimilarity concept originally stated by Mil-
ner [21]. Here, the opposite behaviours compatibility consists in the fact that when
one service can send a message, then the other service must be willing to receive
that message, and when one service is waiting to receive a message, then the other
service must be sending that message. Hence, for any τ handling strategy TS , we
formalise the opposite behaviours compatibility notion as follows:
Two STSs STSi = (Ai ,Si , Ii ,Fi ,Ti), i = {1, 2}, are opposite behaviours compatible
if and only if for each global state (s1, s2) ∈ reachableTS ((I1, I2)):
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user
τ
u2
u5
τ
u4
server
s3
s9
s4 searchHotel?
dep:tdate, ret:tdate, 
category:string
searchFlight? dis:string,dep:tdate, ret:tdate
s5
τ
u7
searchCar?
d1:date,
d2:date,
type:string
searchFlight! dis:string,dep:tdate,ret:tdate
searchCar! 
d1:date,
d2:date,
type:string
searchHotel!
dep:tdate,ret:tdate, 
category:string
u6 u8
u3
Fig. 4. Strong and Weak Incompatible Emissions Receptions at (u4, s4)
• comp-em-recTS ((s1, s2)) = true, and
• if s1 ∈ F1 (s2 ∈ F2, respectively) then s2 ∈ F2 (s1 ∈ F1, respectively).
Example. Considering our running example, as we have explained in the previous
section, com-em-recTS ((u4, s4)) = false if TS is strong or weak . Then, the user and
server protocols are not opposite behaviours compatible with respect to the strong
and weak strategies. However, these protocols are opposite behaviours compatible
according to the trace strategy. For the user and server protocols, we can check that
for each trace global reachable state (ui , sj ) from (u1, s1) com-em-rectrace ((ui , sj )) =
true. We can easily also check the second condition given in the opposite behaviours
deﬁnition.
Unspeciﬁed receptions. One compatibility notion which is less restrictive than
opposite behaviours is that of unspeciﬁed receptions. Here, our unspeciﬁed receptions
deﬁnition is close to that given in [3,23] which consider that two service protocols
are compatible even if one service can receive a message that cannot be sent by the
other service, i.e. additional receptions, and this works in both directions. However,
this deﬁnition requires that if one service can send a message at a reachable state,
then that emission must be willing to be received by the other service. By doing
so, it is also possible that one protocol holds an emission that will not be received
by its partner as long as the state from which this emission goes out is unreachable
during an established interaction.
Two STSs STSi = (Ai ,Si , Ii ,Fi ,Ti ), i ∈ {1, 2}, are unspeciﬁed receptions compat-
ible if and only if for each global state (s1, s2) ∈ reachableTS ((I1, I2)):
• comp-em-recTS ((s1, s2)) = true, and if s1 ∈ F1 (s2 ∈ F2, respectively) then
s2 ∈ F2 (s1 ∈ F1, respectively), or
• ∃(si , li , s
′
i ) ∈ Ti , with i = {1, 2}, li = (mi , ?, pl), 
 ∃(sj , lj , s
′
j ) ∈ Tj , with j =
i mod 2 + 1, such that li and lj are compatible.
Example. In our travel advice running example, the user and server protocols
are unspeciﬁed receptions incompatible according to the strong strategy since at
the global state (u4, s4) there are transition labels, diﬀerent to receptions, at u4
(respectively s4) which do not match with transition labels at s4 (respectively u4).
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user
u7
u8
server
s3
s9
s4 searchHotel?
dep:tdate, ret:tdate, 
category:string
searchFlight? dis:string,dep:tdate, ret:tdate
s5
searchCar? 
d1:date,
d2:date,
type:string
searchHotel!
dep:tdate, ret:tdate, 
category:string
Fig. 5. Additional Receptions at (u4, s4)
However, both protocols are unspeciﬁed receptions compatible with respect to weak
and trace strategies because for all global reachable states (ui , sj ), if there is a
transition label l at ui (respectively sj ) which cannot be matched with a transi-
tion label at sj (respectively ui) thus l is a reception. For instance, let us con-
sider the global reachable state (u7, s4) in Figure 5. At state s4, there are two
additional receptions, namely (searchCar?d1 : date, d2 : date, type : string) and
(searchFlight?dis : string , dep : tdate, ret : tdate), that do not match with the
emission at u7.
Deadlock freeness. This notion is less restrictive than the two previous ones. It
considers that two service protocols are compatible if and only if, starting from their
initial states, they can always evolve until reaching a ﬁnal global state. In order to
formalise our deadlock freeness compatibility, we took inspiration from [2].
Two STSs STSi = (Ai ,Si , Ii ,Fi ,Ti ), i = {1, 2}, are deadlock freeness compatible if
and only if for each global state (s1, s2) ∈ reachableTS ((I1, I2)):
• (s1, s2) ∈ (F1 × F2), or
• successorsTS ((s1, s2)) 
= ∅.
Example. Going back to the travel advice system, the user and server are in-
compatible with respect to the strong strategy since there exists no global strongly
reachable state from (u4, s4), and u4 and s4 are not ﬁnal states. Nevertheless,
these two protocols are deadlock free compatible according to the weak and trace
strategies because, starting from their initial states, for each weak (or trace) global
reachable state (ui , si ) successorsTS ((ui , si )) 
= ∅ until reaching a ﬁnal global state,
where TS is weak or trace.
3.5 Compatibility Checking
We now present a protocol compatibility deﬁnition UPC for two given protocols
described using STSs, a compatibility notion CN and a τ handling strategy TS .
This deﬁnition enables one to check if two service protocols, described using STSs,
are compatible with respect to CN and TS , and reports a counterexample CE if
they are not.
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UPC : {STS1,STS2} ×CN × TS → < Boolean,CE >
4 Encoding into Maude and Tool Support
In this Section, we respectively present a short introduction to Maude, the Maude
encoding of our compatibility checking framework, and the prototype tool that
automates the compatibility veriﬁcation.
4.1 Maude Overview
Maude [6,8,7] is a high-level language and a high-performance interpreter and com-
piler in the OBJ [13] algebraic speciﬁcation family that supports membership equa-
tional logic and rewriting logic speciﬁcation and programming of systems. Thus,
Maude integrates an equational style of functional programming with rewriting logic
computation. In this section we provide an informal description of those Maude fea-
tures necessary for understanding the paper; the interested reader is referred to [8,7]
for more details.
Maude’s underlying equational logic is membership equational logic [18], a Horn
logic whose atomic sentences are equalities t = t ′ and membership assertions of
the form t : S , stating that a term t has sort S . Such a logic extends order-
sorted equational logic, and supports sorts, subsort relations, subsort polymorphic
overloading of operators, and the deﬁnition of partial functions with equationally
deﬁned domains.
In Maude, there are three diﬀerent types of modules: functional, system and
object-oriented modules. We focus here on functional modules (see [8,7] for addi-
tional information). For example, the following Maude functional module deﬁnes
the natural numbers (with sorts Nat of natural numbers and NzNat of nonzero
natural numbers), using the Peano notation, with the zero (0) and successor (s_)
operators as constructors (note the ctor attribute). Then, the addition operation
(_+_) is deﬁned, being its behaviour speciﬁed by two equational axioms. The op-
erators s_ and _+_ are deﬁned using mixﬁx syntax (underscores indicate places for
arguments).
fmod MY-NAT is
sort NzNat Nat .
subsort NzNat < Nat .
op 0 : -> Nat [ctor] .
op s_ : Nat -> NzNat [ctor] .
op _+_ : Nat Nat -> Nat [assoc comm id: 0] .
vars M N : Nat .
eq s M + s N = s (M + N) .
endfm
If an equational speciﬁcation is conﬂuent, terminating, and sort-decreasing, then
it can be executed. Computation in a functional module is accomplished by using
the equations as simpliﬁcation rules from left to right until a canonical form is
reached. Some equations, like the one expressing the commutativity of a binary
operator, are not terminating, but nonetheless they are supported by means of
operator attributes, so that Maude performs simpliﬁcation modulo the equational
theories provided by such attributes, that can be associative (assoc), commutativity
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(comm), and identity (id). The above properties must therefore be understood in
the more general context of simpliﬁcation modulo such equational theories.
In Maude, speciﬁcations may be generic, that is, they may be deﬁned with
other speciﬁcations as parameters. The requirements that a datatype must satisfy
are described by theories. Parameterized modules are instantiated by means of
views. A view shows how a particular module satisﬁes a theory, by mapping sorts
and operations in the theory to sorts and operations in the target module, in such
a way that the induced axioms are provable in the target module.
4.2 Maude Encoding
In this section, we will overview the diﬀerent Maude modules (see Figure 6) used
to encode our approach:
STS Speciﬁcation. A module called STS speciﬁes the service model. STSs are
represented as objects of the form:
< Oid : STS | is : State, fss : Set{State}, ts : Set{Transition} >.
An STS object has an identiﬁer (Oid), a type (STS), and an attribute set which
consists of an initial state (is), a set of ﬁnal states (fss), and a set of transitions
(ts). A transition is a tuple of the form St1 - L -> St2 where St1 and St2 are,
respectively, the source and target states, and L is the label. A label is either a τ
(T) or a tuple of the form M d (PRS), where M is the message name, d stands for
the direction being ? or !, and PRS denotes the parameter list.
Tau Strategies. Two operations successors and comp-em-rec encode the
successorsTS and comp − em − recTS functions, respectively, in three Maude mod-
ules called STRONG, WEAK and TRACE, respectively. For space reasons, we cannot give
all the Maude speciﬁcations implementing these functions. For instance, Figure 7
shows the encoding of the successorstrace function. The successors operation ex-
plores two STS objects (ﬁrst and third arguments in line 1) starting from a global
state (second and forth arguments in line 1) in order to return the set of global
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1 op s uc c e s s o r s : Object State Object State −> Set{Pair{State , State }} .
2
3 ceq su c c e s s o r s (< O : s t s | ( t s : St1 − M ! (PRS1) −> St1 ’ , TS ) , AtS >, St1 ,
4 < O’ : sts ’ | ( t s : St2 − M ? (PRS2) −> St2 ’ , TS ’ ) , AtS ’ >, St2 )
5 = (< St1 ’ , St2 ’ >, s u c c e s s o r s (< O : s t s | t s : TS , AtS >, St1 ,
6 < O’ : sts ’ | t s : TS ’ , AtS ’ >, St2 ) )
7 i f compatible−parameters (PRS1, PRS2 ) .
8
9 ceq su c c e s s o r s (< O : s t s | t s : ( St1 − M ? (PRS1) −> St1 ’ , TS ) , AtS >, St1 ,
10 < O’ : sts ’ | t s : ( St2 − M ! (PRS2) −> St2 ’ , TS ’ ) , AtS ’ >, St2 )
11 = (< St1 ’ , St2 ’ >, s u c c e s s o r s (< O : s t s | t s : TS , AtS >, St1 ,
12 < O’ : sts ’ | t s : TS ’ , AtS ’ >, St2 ) )
13 i f compatible−parameters (PRS1, PRS2) .
14
15 eq s uc c e s s o r s (< O : s t s | t s : ( St1 − T −> St1 ’ , TS) , AtS >, St1 ,
16 < O’ : sts ’ | t s : TS ’ , AtS ’ >, St2 )
17 = ( su c c e s s o r s (< O : s t s | t s : TS , AtS >, St1 ’ ,
18 < O’ : sts ’ | t s : TS ’ , AtS ’ >, St2 ) ,
19 su c c e s s o r s (< O : s t s | t s : TS , AtS >, St1 ,
20 < O’ : sts ’ | t s : TS ’ , AtS ’ >, St2 ) ) .
21
22 eq s uc c e s s o r s (< O : s t s | t s : TS , AtS >, St1 ,
23 < O’ : sts ’ | t s : ( St2 − T −> St2 ’ , TS ’ ) , AtS ’ >, St2 )
24 = ( su c c e s s o r s (< O : s t s | t s : TS, AtS >, St1 ,
25 < O’ : sts ’ | t s : TS ’ , AtS ’ >, St2 ’ ) ,
26 su c c e s s o r s (< O : s t s | t s : TS , AtS >, St1 ,
27 < O’ : sts ’ | t s : TS ’ , AtS ’ >, St2 ) ) .
28
29 eq s uc c e s s o r s (STS1 , St1 , STS2 , St2 ) = empty [ owise ] .
Fig. 7. Maude Encoding of Successors Function wrt the Trace Strategy
states (Set{Pair{State,State}}) reachable, in one step, from the current one
using traces of compatible labels. Regarding the label compatibility, the expres-
sions St1 - M d1 (PRS1) -> St1’ and St2 - M d2 (PRS2) -> St2’ in lines 8-9
require that the two transition labels at St1 and St2 have the same name and oppo-
site directions such that d1 = d2. Then, the compatible-parameters(PRS1, PRS2)
call checks if both parameter lists PRS1 and PRS2 have identical type lists (same
types in the same order).
Compatibility Notions. The opposite behaviours, unspeciﬁed receptions
and deadlock freeness compatibility notions presented in Section 3.4 are speci-
ﬁed into three operations opposite-behaviours, unspecified-receptions and
deadlock-freeness, respectively. Each of these operations evaluates the compat-
ibility of two STSs at all reachable global states with respect to a τ strategy. For
instance, Figure 8 shows the speciﬁcation of the opposite behaviours compatibility
notion. In the very ﬁrst step, the opposite-behaviours operation (line 1) ac-
cepts as arguments two STS objects and returns a tuple consisting of a Boolean
value and a counterexample (Tuple{Bool, Tuple{List{Transition}}}). Then,
in order to check the protocol compatibility at all global reachable states using
a recursive execution, an auxiliary opposite-behaviours operation (lines 8-10) is
called. As it is shown in line 13, the auxiliary opposite-behaviours operation calls
the comp-em-rec operation for each global reachable state (St1,St2). Depending
on the returned Boolean value, it might be possible to recursively call (lines 14-
15) the opposite-behaviours operation for each global state in SPS , i.e., the
set of global states that can be reached from (St1,St2). In the case in which the
comp-em-rec operation returns false, the auxiliary get-counterexample operation
returns a couple of transition sequences starting from the initial states until reach-
ing the incompatibility source. The recursive call can stop if the current global
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1 op opposi te−behaviours : Object Object −> Tuple{Bool , Tuple{L i s t {Trans i t i on }}} .
2
3 op opposi te−behaviours : Object Object Set{Pair{State , State }} Set{Pair{State , State }}
4 −> Tuple{Bool , Tuple{L i s t {Trans i t i on }}} .
5
6 eq opposi te−behaviours (< O : s t s | i s : St1 , AtS >,
7 < O’ : sts ’ | i s : St2 , AtS ’ >)
8 = opposi te−behaviours (< O : s t s | i s : St1 , AtS >,
9 < O’ : sts ’ | i s : St2 , AtS ’ >,
10 < St1 , St2 >, empty) .
11
12 ceq opposi te−behaviours (STS1 , STS2 , (< St1 , St2 >, SPS) , SPS ’ )
13 = i f comp−em−r ec (STS1 , St1 , STS2 , St2 )
14 then opposi te−behaviours (STS1 , STS2 , (SPS , suc c e s s o r s (STS1 , St1 , STS2 , St2 ) ) ,
15 (< St1 , St2 >, SPS ’ ) )
16 e l s e < f a l s e , get−counterexample (STS1 , STS2 , < St1 , St2 >) f i
17 i f not < St1 , St2 > in SPS ’ .
18
19 eq opposi te−behaviours (STS1 , STS2 , SPS , SPS ’ ) = < true , empty > [ owise ] .
Fig. 8. Maude Encoding of Opposite Behaviour Notion
reachable state (St1,St2) has previously been visited (line 17) in order to avoid an
inﬁnite execution in the case of looping protocols.
Compatibility Checking. A module COMPATIBILITY{TSNOTION} implements the
compatibility deﬁnition. The parameter TSNOTION refers to a compatibility notion
(opposite behaviours, unspeciﬁed receptions or deadlock freeness) encoded into a
module called NOTION{STRATEGY}, according to a τ strategy (strong, weak or trace)
taken as a parameter.
4.3 Tool Support
The compatibility checking framework that we have presented in the previous
sections has been fully implemented into a prototype tool (see Figure 9 for an
overview). The STS Maude speciﬁcations are automatically generated using our
script STS2Maude implemented in Python. In order to check the protocol compat-
ibility, we call the Maude’s red(uce) command for the operation which implements
the chosen compatibility notion (e.g., opposite-behaviours), and the τ handling
strategy. A Boolean value and a counterexample are returned indicating whether
two STSs are compatible according to the checked compatibility notion and identi-
fying the incompatibility source, respectively.
So far, our prototype tool has been validated on more than 75 examples, which
range from small examples to real-world ones. The largest example of our database
consists of two services where each one consists of more than 85 states and around 90
transitions. The maximum computation time for this example was about 7 seconds,
and that was needed to check the trace deadlock freeness compatibility.
5 Related Work
During the last 25 years, compatibility has been intensively studied as a main is-
sue in Software Engineering. Let us survey some key related works in this area.
[3,23] have formally deﬁned a compatibility notion for software components using an
automata-based formalism. Their compatibility notion consists of checking two pro-
tocol properties, namely unspeciﬁed receptions and deadlock. More recently, [1,5]
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have used a Finite State Machine (FSM) model to formalise a compatibility notion
for Web services which aims to check whether one service can substitute another
service. In [1], the authors adopt an asymmetric relation, namely simulation, for
determining if a new version of a service behaviour simulates a previous one. [5]
gives a restrictive notion of behavioural compatibility saying that each trace in one
Web service must also be preserved in another Web service. In [16,17,14], the au-
thors rely on bisimulation algorithms to deﬁne the compatibility of Web services
which are described using Petri nets. As regards process algebra, [4] and [10] have
proposed a compatibility notion based on the π-calculus to ensure the successful
composition of Software components and Web services, respectively. Bordeaux et
al. [2] were the ﬁrst who survey several compatibility notions. However, the Labeled
Transition System (LTS) model presented in [2] does not consider value-passing and
internal behaviour, and no tool support exists.
To sum up, there are few compatibility approaches [4,14,17] which take into
account τ actions, and those that deal with them only use one of the possible
strategies. Most of the previous works [3,5,2,1,17,14] consider models where value-
passing is not taken into account. In addition, only a few proposals [1,5] have at
their disposal an implementation to automatically check the proposed compatibil-
ity notions. Compared to these works, we consider a formal interface model which
takes into account both non-observable actions and value-passing. Moreover, we
propose a framework which enables to check, in a uniﬁed manner, several compati-
bility notions, and therefore make our proposal useful for many possible application
domains. Our solution also deals with the subtleties of τ actions, and we have im-
plemented several τ strategies to handle them properly. Since our proposal relies
on an encoding into Maude, the compatibility check is fully automated. Last, the
prototype tool that we implemented goes beyond the check of protocol compatibility
since it is able to return a counterexample.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented a uniﬁed way to check diﬀerent protocol compat-
ibility notions using the rewriting logic system Maude. The compatibility notions
presented in this paper deal with the subtlety of τ actions in service protocols.
Our proposal is completely implemented into a prototype tool which enables a fully
automated check of diﬀerent compatibility notions with respect to the diﬀerent τ
handling strategies. Our prototype tool checks whether two protocols are compati-
ble, but also returns a counterexample to identify the incompatibility source.
As regards future work, we ﬁrst plan to extend our approach to check compati-
bility for n (n > 2) service protocols. We also aim at including more compatibility
notions as well as more τ strategies, and to propose a methodology to make easier
the extension of our approach with these new deﬁnitions. As far as possible applica-
tions are concerned, we would like to rely on our compatibility checking techniques
in order to measure similarity of service protocols. Similarity goes farther than
“Boolean” compatibility by detecting existing mismatches, and measuring the de-
gree of compatibility of two (or more) protocols. Finally, we would like to propose a
high-level language to enable a user to deﬁne his own compatibility notion, and some
encoding techniques that would automatically generate the Maude code needed to
verify this compatibility.
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